This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation game in which every player's payo® depends only on the members of her coalition. We provide three conditions under which the core of such games is non-empty. 
Introduction
In many economic situations, individuals carry out activities by forming coalitions. In this paper we deal with a family of NTU games, namely coalition formation games that are, using the terminology from Drµ eze and Greenberg [8] , hedonic in the sense that every player's payo® depends only on the members of her coalition. In this framework, we de¯ne three conditions called Union Responsiveness, Intersection Responsiveness, and Essentiality. Each one of them guarantees the non-emptiness of the core of the coalition formation games.
Formally, a NTU game can be described by a function which selects, for each non-empty coalition, a set of outcomes that can be reached by the agents belonging to it. Once a coalition is formed, the agents in that coalition are involved in a bargaining process to determine their outcome. Whenever the bargaining processes, one for each possible coalition, are known by the agents before any coalition were formed, we can describe NTU games in a easier and more natural way. That is, de¯ning a function that associates a single allocation to each coalition. Henceforth, if agents' preferences are de¯ned over the set of allocations we can describe an ordering for each agent, whose domain is the set of coalitions she might belong to. Therefore, we could assume that each agent's preferences depend on the set of people belonging to the coalition to which she belongs. In that sense, the resulting problem can be claimed to be a pure hedonic preferences model. The framework we have described can also be understood as a generalization of matching games introduced by Gale and Shapley [9] . Along this line of reasoning we can set as a basic framework the roommate problem introduced in [9] . In the roommate problem whenever the allocation is individually rational, each agent prefers to belong to a coalition in which she is the only component, i.e. to be by herself, rather than belonging to any coalition in which she has two or more colleagues. Gale and Shapley [9] showed that the core of the induced cooperative game might be empty. Nevertheless, if it is possible to¯nd two sets of agents, in such a way that the only coalitions that an agent could consider preferable to her being alone option, if any, are pairs formed by herself and an agent belonging to the set she does not belong to, then the core is always non-empty. This case is known as the marriage problem. This family of problems and some of its extensions (the college admissions problem, assignment problems and job matching problems, among others), have been analyzed extensively by several authors. (The reader is referred to the book by Roth and Sotomayor [10] for a comprehensive study of these problems.)
Unfortunately, it is not always possible to¯nd natural partitions of the agents into two sets, so that the well-known results on two-sided matching markets could be applied to the general coalition-formation problem. In fact, Banerjee et al. [3] shows that there are no core stable coalition partitions even when strong restrictions, such as additive separability or anonymity, are imposed on individuals' preferences even when united with appropriately de¯ned versions of single-peaked preference conditions.
Due to the previous negative results some authors have studied conditions under which the roommate problem has a non-empty core. For instance, Bartholdi and Trick [5] describe a property of agents' preferences to guarantee the existence of stable allocations. Alcalde [1] also studies this family of problems and proposes a condition, called P-reciprocity, that guarantees the existence of core allocations. This author also identi¯es three particular cases of agents' preferences, which he calls snug, heterophilic, and cloned preferences, under which the core is always non-empty.
In a more general setting, Cechl ¶ arov ¶ a and Romero-Medina [7] study a coalition formation problem, in which each agent's preferences over coalitions is related to each agent's opinion of other individuals. They conclude that if every agent's preferences depend only on her best partner in a coalition, the core is always non-empty. On the other hand, if every agent's preferences depend on the worst partner she has in the coalition, they show that the core can be empty. In fact, any coalition having more than two agents is internally dominated, in the sense of the core, by a coalition with two individuals. This fact points out a formal equivalence, relative to core con¯gurations, between the coalition formation problem by Cechl ¶ arov ¶ a and Romero-Medina and the Gale and Shapley's roommate problem.
Following the coalition formation approach, some authors have studied conditions under which the core is non-empty in these games, when each agent's preferences only depend on the coalition she belongs to. In this sense, Banerjee et al. [3] introduce a condition, they call the top coalition property, which is a natural extension of Alcalde's [1] P-reciprocity. These authors show that, if agents' preferences satisfy the top coalition property, or a weaker version of it, the core of the coalition formation problem is non-empty.
Bogomolnaia and Jackson [6] also focus on conditions under which a coalition formation problem has stable allocations. These authors identify two properties, they call ordinal balanceness and weak consecutiveness, and show that when agents' preferences satisfy any of the two conditions, the core of the related coali-tion formation game is non-empty.
The conditions introduced by Banerjee et al. [3] and by Bogomolnaia and Jackson [6] do not introduce restrictions on each agents' preferences, but on the preferences pro¯le, i.e. preferences' domains cannot be expressed as a Cartesian product of agents' preferences. For this reason, the analysis of whether some of these conditions are satis¯ed or not by agents' preferences becomes a problem that can be as di±cult to solve as the (direct) study of the existence of core allocations.
Each of the three conditions proposed in this paper are described in each agent's preferences, rather than in the preferences pro¯les. This fact produces two interesting features. First, it is very easy to evaluate whether or not agents' preferences satisfy our conditions. Hence, it would be possible to design e±cient algorithms selecting stable allocations and decide whether these algorithms can be used in a given preferences pro¯le. Second, when conditions are stated on each agent's preferences, it is easy to study whether the introduction of a new agent into the problem introduces instabilities. Note that, if conditions are stated on agents' preference pro¯les, rather than on individuals' preferences, the analysis of this problem is not limited to the new agent but to the complete pro¯le. This fact will greatly hinder e®orts to carry out any comparative static analysis over a certain pro¯le.
The Union Responsiveness Condition (URC) models the idea of economic situations where \more is better" but any coalition can be improved by preserving the colleagues we will choose in that coalition and eliminating those colleagues we would rather not have in that particular coalition. If every agent's preferences satisfy these two simple ideas, expressed formally in three statements, we can guarantee the existence of core allocations in the coalition formation game. The proof that URC guarantees the core non-emptiness is a constructive one and gives us some insight into the structure that URC stable coalition might have.
The idea behind the Intersection Responsiveness Condition (IRC) is the following: given two coalitions with a non-empty intersection the coalition formed by the agents on the intersection is better than the worse of the two previous coalitions. The intuition behind the IRC becomes clearer if we assume that the agents are ordered along a line from less to more valuable and we allow coalitions only among connected agents. In this case, the IRC implies that the agents are more valuable as we go along the line and any agent or coalition of agents can dominate a coalition formed by the agents' below them. The IRC generalizes this intuition to the multidimensional case. We provide a non-constructive proof of the existence of stable allocations when the agents' preference satis¯es the IRC.
The last condition we introduce in this paper is called Essentiality. The condition models economic situations where, for each individual, there is a group of agents that belong to any coalition she considers acceptable. In addition given two possible coalitions that contain her group of essential agents she prefers the one that contains fewer non-essential members.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, identi¯es the problem to be analyzed, and presents a formal de¯nition for Union Responsiveness, Intersection Responsiveness, and Essentiality, three conditions that guarantee the existence of stable coalition structures. The results of the paper can be found in Section 3. In particular, we prove the independence of the above conditions (Proposition 3. 
De¯nitions and Examples
Consider a set N of agents, N = f1; : : : ; i; : : : ; ng, who have to form coalitions. Each agent i is endowed with preferences % i which can be represented by a linear order over the set P i = f¿ µ N : i 2 ¿ g. A coalition structure T = f¿ 1 ; : : : ; ¿ j ; : : : ; ¿ t g is a partition of the set of agents. Given a partition T and an agent i, let ¿ i denote the element on T which i belongs to. Finally, and for notational convenience, let us extend agents' preferences to be de¯ned over the set of coalition structures in the following natural way: T % iT if, and only if, ¿ i % i¿ i .
Our objective in this paper is to analyze, for each coalition formation problem, fN; %g, the set of allocations that are expected to hold, taking into account agents' preferences. The core describes when an allocation is considered stable and, therefore, is expected to be the consequence of agents' collective decisions. De¯nition 2.1. Let fN; %g be a coalition formation problem, and T be a coalition structure for such a problem. We say that T is stable, or is in the core of fN; %g, if there is no set of agents S, ; 6 = S µ N , such that, for each i 2 S, S Â i ¿ i : We say that a set S of players blocks allocation T whenever S Â i ¿ i for all i 2 S: Finally, we say that an allocation T is individually rational if it is not blocked by any individual, i.e., ¿ i % i fig for all agent i.
Unfortunately, as we said before, the set of stable allocations can be empty for some instances. In order to show this, consider the following example.
Example 2.2. Five cannot play Dominoes.
Let us consider¯ve agents who want to play a game of dominoes. Following the classical rules of domino, a game cannot be played by more than four agents. Four is also the optimal number of agents to play a dominoes game. Versions for two and three players can be played, but usually are not considered so exciting as the four-agent one. Hence, everybody prefers to play a four-agent game rather than any other option. To show that the core can be empty, let us consider the following agents' preferences. f1; 2; 3; 4g Â 1 f1; 2; 3; 5g Â 1 f1; 2; 4; 5g Â 1 f1; 3; 4; 5g Â 1 ¿ 1 for any other coalition ¿ 1 . f2; 3; 4; 5g Â 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g Â 2 f1; 2; 3; 5g Â 2 f1; 2; 4; 5g Â 2 ¿ 2 for any other coalition ¿ 2 . f1; 3; 4; 5g Â 3 f2; 3; 4; 5g Â 3 f1; 2; 3; 4g Â 3 f1; 2; 3; 5g Â 3 ¿ 3 for any other coalition ¿ 3 . f1; 2; 4; 5g Â 4 f1; 3; 4; 5g Â 4 f2; 3; 4; 5g Â 4 f1; 2; 3; 4g Â 4 ¿ 4 for any other coalition ¿ 4 . f1; 2; 3; 5g Â 5 f1; 2; 4; 5g Â 5 f1; 3; 4; 5g Â 5 f2; 3; 4; 5g Â 5 ¿ 5 for any other coalition ¿ 5 .
In this example, there is no core allocation. Note that coalition f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g is blocked by any set containing four agents. Each allocation in which no coalition contains four agents is blocked by any four-agent set. Henceforth, any stable coalition structure should have the form [N n fig ; fig], i.e. four agents will play a game and the remaining agent will not play. To show that the core is empty, we concentrate on the possible four-agents coalitions. [f1; 2; 3; 4g ; f5g] is blocked by f2; 3; 4; 5g; [f2; 3; 4; 5g ; f1g] is blocked by f1; 3; 4; 5g; [f1; 3; 4; 5g ; f2g] is blocked by f1; 2; 4; 5g; [f1; 2; 4; 5g ; f3g] is blocked by f1; 2; 3; 5g; and [f1; 2; 3; 5g ; f4g] is blocked by f1; 2; 3; 4g.
Next we introduce a property we call the Union Responsiveness Condition, that guarantees the existence of stable allocations. (See Theorem 3.2.) First of all, let us introduce some additional notation. Given a subset of individuals S, and an agent i 2 S, Ch i (S) denotes i's choice on S, i.e. % i maximal on 2 S . De¯nition 2.3. We say that agent i's preferences % i satisfy the Union Responsiveness Condition, URC in short, if
(ii) For each two coalitions ¿ i and ¿
The idea behind the three conditions above is the following. Condition (i) states that adding a group of colleagues that includes the best from a better coalition will increase the satisfaction o®er by the latter. Condition (ii) can be interpreted as follows. Each agent has her own opinion about which colleague she prefers in a coalition. Once this distinction has been established, an agent prefers a coalition that has the fewest possible undesirable colleagues. Condition (iii) establishes that adding colleagues that are unacceptable for i to a coalition will never make this agent better o®. The next example shows a coalition formation problem whose agents' preferences satisfy the Union Responsiveness Condition.
Example 2.4. Consider a three-agent coalition formation problem. Let agents' preferences be:
In this example, agents' preferences satisfy the Union Responsiveness Condition. Is is easy to check that allocation [f1; 2; 3g] is stable for this problem.
The ful¯llment of the following Intersection Responsiveness Condition by agents' preferences is also su±cient to guarantee the existence of stable allocations. (See Theorem 3.6.) De¯nition 2.5. We say that agent i's preferences % i satisfy the Intersection Responsiveness Condition, IRC in short, if for each two coalitions, ¿ i and
1 In order to avoid confusion, let us note that, throughout the paper, the symbol ½ will be employed for the strict inclusion, i.e. A ½ B will always imply that A 6 = B.
The idea behind this condition is the following. Consider that agent i prefers coalition ¿ i rather than coalition ¿ 0 i . In such a case, individuals being in ¿ 0 i and not in ¿ i are considered as undesirables by this agent. Henceforth, she will prefer to remain with the agents in ¿ 0 i that are also in ¿ i rather than to form a coalition with all the agents in ¿ 0 i . The next property, that we call Essentiality, introduces a condition on agents' preferences that does not allow the possibility of core emptiness. 
We say that agent i's preferences satisfy Essentiality whenever a coalition exists which is essential for her. Finally, we say that i is self-su±cient if fig is essential for her.
Essentiality can be interpreted in a very simple way. Let us imagine that each individual has a set of agents she considers her good friends. An agent does not want to be in a coalition which does not include all her friends (Conditions (i) and (ii:a) in De¯nition 2.6). Moreover, given two possible coalitions, she wants to be in the one having the lower number of agents who are not her friends (Condition (ii:b) in De¯nition 2.6). In such a case, we can say that one's good friends become essential to each individual. Notice that this relation of friendship might not satisfy symmetry. The following example shows a problem whose agents' preferences satisfy Essentiality.
Example 2.7. Consider a four-agent coalition formation problem, whose agents' preferences are: f1; 2g Â 1 f1; 2; 4g Â 1 f1; 2; 3g Â 1 f1; 2; 3; 4g Â 1 f1g Â 1 ¿ 1 for any other coalition ¿ 1 . f2; 3g Â 2 f1; 2; 3g Â 2 f2; 3; 4g Â 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g Â 2 f2g Â 2 ¿ 2 for any other coalition ¿
In this example, f1; 2g is essential for 1; f2; 3g is essential for agent 2; f1; 3g is the essential coalition for 3; and f2; 4g is essential for agent 4. As the reader can check, the only stable allocation for this problem is [f1; 2; 3g ; f4g].
Existence of Stable Coalition Structures
In this section we show how each one of the conditions we have introduced in Section 2 separately guarantees the existence of stable allocations. First, we want to stress the relationship held between the above properties. In particular, we will see that these properties independent, as Proposition 3.1 shows.
Proof.
To prove this statement, we will provide agents' preferences that satisfy some of the above mentioned properties, but do not satisfy the remaining two.
[1 ] Preferences satisfying URC and not verifying IRC, or Essentiality.
Let us consider an individual, say 1, which exhibits the following preferences for a three-agent problem.
f1; 2; 3g Â 1 f1; 2g Â 1 f1; 3g Â 1 f1g .
In this case, agent 1's preferences satisfy URC. Nevertheless, these preferences do not satisfy IRC because f1; 2g Â 1 f1; 3g, f1; 3g Â 1 f1g and f1; 2g \ f1; 3g = f1g. Note that IRC should imply that f1g Â 1 f1; 3g. Moreover, there is no set of agents who are essential for 1.
[2 ] Preferences satisfying IRC and not verifying URC, or Essentiality.
Let us consider an individual, say 1, which exhibits the following preferences for a four-agent problem. f1; 2; 4g Â 1 f1; 2g Â 1 f1g Â 1 f1; 4g Â 1 f1; 3; 4g Â 1 f1; 3g Â 1 f1; 2; 3g Â 1 f1; 2; 3; 4g .
In this case, agent 1's preferences satisfy IRC. Nevertheless, these preferences do not satisfy URC because f1; 2g Â 1 f1g, f1g Â 1 f1; 2; 3g and f1; 2g ½ f1; 2; 3g. So, these preferences do not ful¯ll Condition (i) in De¯nition 2.3. Moreover, there is not set of agents who are essential for 1.
[3 ] Preferences satisfying Essentiality and not verifying URC, or IRC.
Let us consider an individual, say 1, which exhibits the following preferences for a four-agent problem.
Coalition Formation and the Union Responsiveness Condition
This section will provide a positive answer to the existence of stable allocations in problems whose agents exhibit preferences satisfying URC. An interesting feature of the proof that we provide is that it is constructive, i.e. we give a procedure to build stable allocations for any problem in which the Union Responsiveness Condition is ful¯lled. Theorem 3.2. Suppose that preferences % i of each agent i satisfy the Union Responsiveness Condition. Then there is at least one stable coalition structure T .
Proof.
We proceed in a constructive way. We will build a coalition structure and prove that, if the preferences satisfy URC, this partition is stable. This structure is constructed according to the following algorithm.
: : : ; ¿ t ; : : : ; ¿ h ª be a coalition structure resulting from this procedure. Since the set of agents is¯nite, this coalition structure always exists. We claim that T is stable.
First, note that, since the set of agents is¯nite we can ensure that, for each stage k, the set ¿ k is well-de¯ned. Now, we show that ¿ 1 is internally stable. Since k < h, and by the way in which T has been constructed we know that
we conclude that
Let S divide into two disjoint non-empty sets, S 0 and S 00 , where S 0 = ¿ k \ S and S 00 = SÂS 0 . Note that the property stated in Equation (3.1) holds for each agent in S 0 . Now, remember that by construction of
In order to clarify the working of the algorithm introduced in the proof above, let us consider the following example. Example 3.3. Let us consider the following four-agent problem f1; 2g Â 1 f1; 2; 3g Â 1 f1; 2; 4g Â 1 f1; 2; 3; 4g Â 1 f1g Â 1 ¿ 1 for any other coalition ¿ 1 . f2; 3g Â 2 f1; 2; 3g Â 2 f2; 3; 4g Â 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g Â 2 f2g Â 2 ¿ 2 for any other coalition ¿ 2 . f1; 3g Â 3 f1; 2; 3g Â 3 f1; 3; 4g Â 3 f1; 2; 3; 4g Â 3 f3g Â 3 ¿ 3 for any other coalition ¿ 3 . f3; 4g Â 4 f1; 3; 4g Â 4 f2; 3; 4g Â 4 f1; 2; 3; 4g Â 4 f4g Â 4 ¿ 4 for any other coalition ¿ 4 .
In such a case, we have Ch 1 (N ) = f1; 2g; Ch 2 (N ) = f2; 3g; Ch 3 (N ) = f1; 3g; and Ch 4 (N ) = f3; 4g. Henceforth, the set ¿ 1 = f1; 2; 3g satis¯es the conditions of the Stage (1) in the algorithm. Therefore, at the second (and last) stage, we have the situation where the only agent remaining in the market is agent 4, so the set ¿ 2 = f4g is the only one which satis¯es the condition established for that stage. Hence the application of our algorithm gives the formation of two coalitions, namely ¿ 1 = f1; 2; 3g and ¿ 2 = f4g. The reader can check that the outcome [f1; 2; 3g ; f4g] is stable for this problem.
Coalition Formation and the Intersection Responsiveness Condition
We next deal with the analysis of agents satisfying the Intersection Responsiveness Condition. We provide a non-constructive proof of the existence of stable allocations. In fact, our proof has some similarities with that presented in Sotomayor [12] for two-sided matching markets. We¯rst introduce a property which describes how the concepts of Pareto e±ciency and stability are related under IRC. In particular, we will see that Pareto e±ciency and an internal rationality property together characterize, in this framework, the core of the coalition formation problem. This result will help us to show that, in coalition formation problems whose agents' preferences satisfy IRC, the core is always non-empty. (ii) For each coalition ¿ j in T and for any set of agents ; 6 = S ½ ¿ j , there is an agent i 2 S such that ¿ j Â i S.
Proof.
Note that, if either of the two conditions above are not satis¯ed by T , this allocation is not in the core of fN; %g. If fact, if Pareto e±ciency is not satis¯ed, any allocation T 0 Pareto dominating T will give us a coalition (which is formed in T 0 but it is not in T ) blocking T . Moreover, if Condition (ii) is not satis¯ed, there is a coalition, say ¿ j , containing a set S such that S blocks T . On the other hand, let us consider an allocation T satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) above. Suppose that T is not in the core. Then, a blocking coalition T exist. Thus, for each agent i 2 T , T Â i ¿ i . Since T is Pareto e±cient, there is an agent{ 2 T , so that ¿{ \ T 6 = ¿{. Then, by De¯nition 2.5, T \ ¿{ Â h ¿{ holds for each agent h 2 T \ ¿{, which contradicts Condition (ii) above.
Lemma 3.5. Let fN; %g be a coalition formation problem, and F (%) be the set of allocations satisfying Condition (ii) in Proposition 3.4. If allocation T is Pareto e±cient in F (%) then it is Pareto e±cient for the problem fN; %g.
Let us assume that T is Pareto e±cient restricted to F (%) but is not e±cient for fN; %g. Then, there should be an allocation, say e T which Pareto dominates T , i.e.¿ i % i ¿ i for all i 2 N and¿{ Â{ ¿{ for some agent{. Since T 2 F (%) there is no agent i for which¿ i ½ ¿ i . Therefore, it should be the case that (a) there is an agent i such that¿
If case (a) holds, assume that, for agent{,¿{ 6 =¿{ \ ¿{ 6 = ¿{. In such a case, for each agent i 2¿{,¿{ Â i ¿ i . Applying De¯nition 2.5, we have¿{ \ ¿{ Â i ¿{ for each i 2¿{ \ ¿{, which contradicts the fact that T 2 F (%).
If case (b) holds, since T is e±cient restricted to F (%), then e T = 2 F (%). Hence, there is an agent{ and coalition S ½¿{ such that S Â i¿{ for all i 2 S. Assume that there is an agentĥ 2 S for which S \ ¿ĥ 6 = ¿ĥ (otherwise, an allocation can be built in F (%) Pareto dominating T which satis¯es the property described above). So, for all agent h in S \ ¿ĥ, S \ ¿ĥ Â h ¿ h , which contradicts the fact that T was in F (%). Theorem 3.6. Let fN; %g be a coalition formation problem whose agents' preferences satisfy the Intersection Responsiveness Condition. Then the set of stable coalition structures is non-empty.
To prove the previous statement, note that F (%) is non-empty. In fact, the allocationT where¿ i = fig for each i in N is always in F (%). Moreover, since F (%) is¯nite, there should be an allocation b T which is Pareto e±cient in F (%). By Lemma 3.5 b T is Pareto e±cient. So, b T satis¯es conditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 3.4 and, hence, it is in the core of fN; %g.
Coalition Formation and Essentiality
This section deals with the existence of stable allocations when agents' preferences exhibit Essentiality. Some of the de¯nitions and tools introduced in this section do not make sense in environments not satisfying Essentiality. This is why we assume throughout this section that agents' preferences satisfy Essentiality.
First we introduce the main result of this section. The remainder of the section deals with the tools needed to give a constructive proof for Theorem 3.7.
Theorem 3.7. Let fN; %g be a coalition formation problem. Assume that each agent's preferences satisfy Essentiality. Then, there is a stable coalition con¯gu-ration for such a problem. Moreover, the core of fN; %g is a singleton.
Before introducing a formal proof for Theorem 3.7, let us construct a correspondence which will help us to understand how to¯nd stable allocations in problems whose agents satisfy Essentiality. Let E : 2 N ! 2 N be a correspondence which associates with each set of individuals, T µ N , a set of agents, E (T ) = [ i2T fS µ N j S is essential for ig. Note that, under Essentiality, a coalition structure T is individually rational if, and only if, (a) for each individual i, such that ¿ i 6 = fig, E (fig) µ ¿ i , and (b) there is no auto-su±cient agent, say i, such that ¿ i 6 = fig. This statement gives us an idea of how to build individually rational allocations. In fact, imagine that there is no auto-su±cient agent, then any coalition structure T such that E (¿ j ) = ¿ j , for each ¿ j 2 T not being a singleton, satis¯es individual rationality. Thus, loosely speaking, a¯x point for E (¢) can be understood as a coalition that is not blocked by an individual. This property suggests that we de¯ne sel¯sh coalitions, a concept that is useful in our proof of Theorem 3.7.
De¯nition 3.8. We say that a coalition T is sel¯sh for problem fN; %g if E (T ) = T and there is no coalition
Note that any two di®erent sel¯sh coalitions are disjoints, i.e., if S and T are two sel¯sh coalitions for fN; %g, S 6 = T , then S \T = ;. Since the correspondence E (¢) has¯x points, in particular E (N ) = N , the use of such correspondence and the idea of sel¯sh coalitions can be used to show the existence of stable structures for any problem satisfying Essentiality.
The next proposition characterizes the set of stable allocations under Essentiality.
Proposition 3.9. Let fN; %g be a coalition formation problem whose agents' preferences satisfy Essentiality. Then, an allocation T is stable for fN; %g if, and only if, 1. T is individually rational, 2. T is Pareto e±cient, and 3. For each coalition ¿ j 2 T which is not sel¯sh, ¿ j is a singleton.
Proof.
It is straightforward to see that the above conditions are necessary to guarantee the stability of an allocation T . To prove su±ciency, let us suppose that an allocation, say T , is unstable for fN; %g, and assume that it satis¯es e±ciency and individual rationality. We prove that this allocation does not satisfy Condition (3) above.
Since T is unstable, it should be a coalition, say S, blocking T . Because of T 's individual rationality, S cannot be formed by a single agent. T 's Pareto e±ciency implies that S can not be formed by the union of some coalitions belonging to T , i.e. @ ¿ k 1 ; : : : ; ¿ k j ; : : : ;
Henceforth, there should be a coalition ¿ j 2 T such that S \ ¿ j 6 = ; and ¿ j nS 6 = ;. Since T is individually rational, and ¿ j is not a singleton, such coalition should satisfy that E (¿ j ) = ¿ j . The fact that S blocks T implies, in particular, that for each i 2 S \ ¿ j , S Â i ¿ j . This fact, together with T 's individual rationality, implies that
Therefore, there exists a coalition which is not a singleton, ¿ j , that is not sel¯sh, which contradicts Condition (3).
The result established in Proposition 3.9 will help us to prove Theorem 3.7. In fact, to construct stable allocations, we only need to identify the set of sel¯sh coalitions. Once the above mentioned coalitions have been identi¯ed, the only stable coalition con¯guration will be formed by the sel¯sh coalitions and coalitions having only one agent. Next we deal with an interesting property satis¯ed by thē x points of correspondence E (¢) which will help us to¯nd sel¯sh coalitions (Lemma 3.10) and a simple procedure to¯nd¯x points for E (¢).
Lemma 3.10. Let fN; %g be a coalition formation problem whose agents' preferences satisfy Essentiality, and let S and T be two coalitions such that E (S) = S and We next introduce a simple algorithm, that we call the E -algorithm, which selects¯x points for correspondence E (¢). This algorithm will select for each starting agent, say i, the smallest¯x point for E (¢) containing agent i. Construct the set S
, then the algorithm stops, and let the outcome be S i = S k i . Otherwise, go to the next stage. Remark 1. Note that, since the set of agents is¯nite and, for any set S, S µ E (S), this algorithm will always end. Clearly, the outcome of the algorithm depends on the selected initial agent. By exchanging these starting agents, we can obtain up to n di®erent¯x points for the correspondence E (¢).
As we mentioned earlier, the E -algorithm selects, for each starting agent, the minimal¯x point for E (¢) containing that agent. This is the aim of Lemma 3.12.
Lemma 3.12. Let fN; %g be a coalition formation problem whose agents' preferences satisfy Essentiality. Let S i be the output of the E -algorithm when agent i is the initial agent. Then S i µ ¿ i for any coalition ¿ i such that i 2 ¿ i = E (¿ i ).
Let ¿ i be a coalition satisfying i 2 ¿ i = E (¿ i ). Since i 2 S i \ ¿ i , Lemma 3.10 says that E (S i \ ¿ i ) = S i \ ¿ i . Henceforth, to prove our result, we only have to show that ¿ i cannot be strictly contained in S i .
To¯nd a contradiction, let us suppose that ¿ i ½ S i . Then, there should be an agent, say{, such that{ 2 S i n¿ i . Letk be the¯rst stage in the algorithm in which agent{ appears, i.e.k = min
Applying an iterative argument, and taking into account that E r (fh
for any integer r, we have that{ = 2 E r (fh 0 g) for any integer r. Taking r =k, and h 0 = i, we have that{ = 2 Ek (fig), which contradicts that { 2 Sk i .
We are now ready to introduce an allocation, which we call the T E coalition structure. This allocation will be useful in proving Theorem 3.7. As we will see, the T E coalition structure is in the core of the related coalition formation problem. Its stability is a consequence of the minimal property of each S i shown in Lemma 3.12. This property together with the facts pointed out by Proposition 3.9 and Lemma 3.10, will be enough to guarantee the stability of such allocation. De¯nition 3.13. Let fN; %g be a coalition formation problem whose agents' preferences satisfy Essentiality. Let S i be the output of the E -algorithm introduced in De¯nition 3.11 when agent i is the starting agent. We de¯ne the E -allocation, the coalition con¯guration T E such that, for each agent
Note that, as a direct consequence of Lemma 3.12, T E describes a partition of N , the set of agents. The next example illustrates how the E-algorithm does work, and how to construct T E in a six-agent problem.
Example 3.14. Let fN; %g be a coalition formation problem whose agents' preferences satisfy Essentiality, with N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g. Let agents' essential coalitions be E (f1g) = f1; 2; 6g, E (f2g) = f2; 3; 5g, E (f3g) = f3; 4g, E (f4g) = f4; 5g, E (f5g) = f3; 5g, and E (f6g) = f6g. The working of the E -algorithm when agent 3 is the starting agent is: Stage 1. S Applying the E -algorithm when agents other than 3 are the starting agents, we have that S 1 = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g, S 2 = f2; 3; 4; 5g, S 4 = f3; 4; 5g, S 5 = f3; 4; 5g, and S 6 = f6g. Henceforth, the E -allocation is de¯ned as follows. ¿
Final Remarks
In this paper we have introduced some conditions; and we have shown that each one of them can guarantee the existence of core allocations in coalition formation games. These conditions can be interpreted in economic terms and it makes it easier to decide whether they can be applied to a particular economic situation. Moreover, our conditions are imposed on individual preferences. This simpli¯es the process of checking whether the restrictions are satis¯ed or not for a given preference pro¯le. This circumstance is particularly interesting if a new agent is added to a pro¯le of preferences that already satis¯es one of the conditions because we can check if the new pro¯le does it as well simply by checking the preferences of the new agent.
On technical grounds we have used both constructive and non-constructive techniques to prove our results. Constructive proofs have been provided for environments whose agents' preferences satisfy Union Responsiveness or Essentiality. The non-constructive proof provided for the case of agents' preferences satisfying the Intersection Responsiveness condition is inspired by the arguments given in Sotomayor [12] for the case of marriage markets.
The fact that the restrictions are imposed on agents' preferences, not on preference pro¯les, allows us to consider as an extension of our results the possibility of carrying out the analysis of dynamic aspects in our model. Some of them can be stated straightforwardly. A¯rst approach can be taken by assuming that agents can leave a coalition freely, i.e. agents do not sign a contract requiring that all the agents in a coalition, when formed, are committed to it. In such a case, the analysis of stability can be done following a study of comparative statics. Such a study is simple in our case. A second approach, which becomes more di±cult to study, can be stated by assuming that, once a coalition is formed, it can accept new agents but no agent can leave that coalition. In such a case, we need to state which procedure a coalition will employ to decide whether or not to accept new agents. This problem can be dealt with by combining our results with those of Barberµ a et al. [4] , that study the problem of how clubs decide the acceptance of new members in a dynamic setting.
A second extension of the analysis is the study of agents' strategic behavior when faced with rules for selecting stable allocations. A¯rst approach can be found in Alcalde and Revilla [2] . These authors study the case in which agents' preferences satisfy Essentiality. They prove the existence of a strategy-proof mechanism in which agents declare their essential coalition and select the (unique) stable allocation.
